A textual, legal, and comparative study of divorce regulation, moral boundaries, and maturity requirements in the Qur’an, examined alongside the Talmud and the Kolbrin.
Introduction
Claims that the Qur’an authorizes marriage to minors or promotes sexual immorality typically rest on isolating Qur’an 65:4 from its legal context and reading it through later dogmatic assumptions. This approach detaches the verse from the subject it explicitly addresses—divorce—and ignores foundational Qur’anic principles that govern morality, legal capacity, and interpretation.
This article does not defend a theological position. It examines whether such claims can survive a contextual reading of the Qur’an, supported by internal Qur’anic constraints and corroborated by older legal traditions preserved in rabbinic law and the Kolbrin.
1. Surah At-Talāq (65): Divorce, Not Marriage
O Prophet, when you divorce women, divorce them for their waiting period, and count the waiting period. Fear Allah, your Lord. Do not turn them out of their houses, nor should they leave, unless they commit a clear immorality.
(Qur’an 65:1)
The opening verse defines the subject unambiguously: divorce. The surah regulates the waiting period (ʿiddah), residence during that period, restraint against expulsion, and moral accountability. Nothing in the opening framework introduces marriage initiation, age eligibility, or sexual entitlement.1
2. Qur’an 65:4 Within That Framework
And those who no longer expect menstruation among your women—if you are in doubt— their waiting period is three months; and likewise for those who have not menstruated. And for those who are pregnant, their term is until they give birth.
(Qur’an 65:4)
The verse addresses cases where menstruation cannot serve as a reliable indicator for determining pregnancy. It resolves legal uncertainty after divorce by fixing a waiting period or extending it until childbirth.2
The legal function is precautionary: preventing confusion of lineage, safeguarding rights, and restraining premature remarriage. The verse does not legislate marriage, age, or sexual access. Those elements must be imported from outside the text.
3. Foundational Constraint: Maturity and Legal Capacity (Qur’an 4:6)
Test the orphans until they reach marriage. Then, if you perceive in them sound judgment, deliver to them their property.
(Qur’an 4:6)
This verse establishes a decisive principle: serious legal responsibility—including marriage and property management—is tied to rushd, sound judgment and discernment. The individual must be capable of reasoning, managing affairs, and bearing responsibility.3
Any interpretation of Qur’an 65:4 that normalizes marriage without such capacity directly conflicts with this internal standard. The Qur’an does not allow one passage to cancel another.
4. The Governing Moral Axiom: God Does Not Command Immorality
Say: Allah does not command immorality.
(Qur’an 7:28)
This verse functions as a rule of interpretation. Readings that attribute sexual injustice, exploitation, or moral corruption to divine command must be rejected or re-examined.4
This axiom applies equally to marriage and divorce. Where an interpretation produces immorality, the fault lies in the reading, not the revelation.
5. Kolbrin Parallels: Consent, Protection, and Reconciliation
a) Consent and maturity
It is decreed that a man shall not pledge his daughter in marriage while she is still young, but must wait until she can say “yes” or “no” to his choice.
(Kolbrin, SOF 5:65)
Test the orphans until they reach marriage; then, if you perceive in them sound judgment, deliver to them their property.
(Qur’an 4:6)
Both texts bind marriage to discernment and consent. Neither permits binding a person who lacks the capacity to judge, choose, and manage responsibility.
b) Reconciliation before divorce
It is decreed that before a man and woman come to judges seeking a divorcement, there shall have been a meeting between those of their blood… Let them strive to heal the breach with goodwill.
(Kolbrin, SOF 5:69)
If you fear a breach between them, appoint an arbiter from his people and an arbiter from her people. If they desire reconciliation, Allah will cause it between them.
(Qur’an 4:35)
Both frameworks require mediation and an attempt at reconciliation before final separation, placing responsibility above impulsive dissolution.
c) Pregnancy and protection during divorce
A woman shall not be divorced while carrying a child or suckling it.
(Kolbrin, SOF 5:76)
And for those who are pregnant, their term is until they give birth.
(Qur’an 65:4)
In both texts, pregnancy suspends normal divorce procedure to protect the child and clarify legal responsibility.
6. Moral Symmetry: Chastity and Character
Wanton women for fornicators and good women for good men, that is the rule.
(Kolbrin, SOF 5:68)
Corrupt women are for corrupt men, and corrupt men are for corrupt women; and good women are for good men, and good men are for good women.
(Qur’an 24:26)
Both texts articulate a principle of moral correspondence. Marriage is framed as a union of compatible character, not a mechanism for exploitation or imbalance.
7. Rabbinic Law: The Three-Month Waiting Period
A woman may not remarry until three months have passed, whether she was divorced or widowed, in order to distinguish between the seed of the first husband and the seed of the second.
(Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 41a)
The purpose of the three-month waiting period is to determine whether the woman is pregnant, so that the identity of the father will not be in doubt.
(Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, Commentary on Yevamot 41a)
This rule, known as havchanat zeraʿ (“distinguishing the seed”), exists to prevent confusion of lineage and legal responsibility. The same legal logic appears in Qur’an 65:4.
The Kolbrin demonstrates that this concern predates rabbinic codification, indicating continuity rather than later invention.
Conclusion
The Qur’an does not command marriage to minors nor does it promote immorality. Surah At-Talāq regulates divorce through legal precaution. Qur’an 4:6 anchors marriage and legal responsibility in maturity and discernment. Qur’an 7:28 establishes that immorality cannot be attributed to God.
Rabbinic law and the Kolbrin confirm the same underlying legal and moral patterns. Where immoral conclusions arise, they stem from interpretive imposition—not from the texts themselves.
Clarifying the Phrase “If You Are in Doubt” (Qur’an 65:4)
A frequent objection asks why women who do not menstruate would be required to observe a waiting period, on the assumption that they cannot become pregnant. This objection rests on a false premise. The Qur’anic text itself does not claim certainty; it explicitly introduces the condition of doubt.
And those who no longer expect menstruation among your women—if you are in doubt— their waiting period is three months…
(Qur’an 65:4)
The phrase “if you are in doubt” does not express moral suspicion toward women. It indicates legal and biological uncertainty. The absence of menstruation does not, in itself, constitute proof that pregnancy is impossible. Early pregnancy may remain undetectable, and legal systems cannot operate on assumptions where lineage and responsibility are at stake.
The three-month waiting period functions as a minimum precautionary interval in which pregnancy either becomes evident or can reasonably be excluded. The purpose is not distrust of women, but protection of lineage, inheritance, and the rights of the child.
This same legal logic appears in older legal traditions, where a standardized waiting period is applied regardless of personal assumptions, precisely to avoid error. The Qur’an follows this established pattern rather than introducing a moral judgment.